Introduction

Background

1. The Department of Justice is responsible for corrections services in Nunavut, as outlined in the Corrections Act (1988) and its regulations. Within the Department, the Corrections Division is responsible for probation, parole, aftercare, and adult institutional services. It is also responsible for the custodial detention of youth as well as their supervision in the community under the federal Youth Criminal Justice Act and territorial Young Offenders Act. Its mission is to “protect society by exercising reasonable control of offenders, and by providing a range of programs to assist offenders to become law-abiding members of the community.”

2. The territory has six correctional facilities:

• the Baffin Correctional Centre,
• the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility,
• the Kugluktuk Ilavut Centre,
• the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre,
• the Nunavut Women’s Correctional Centre, and
• the Isumaqsunngittukkuvik Youth Facility.

Nunavut’s facilities house inmates on remand and those sentenced to a period of incarceration shorter than two years. The Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre and one unit in the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility serve as transitional placement for inmates at the end of their sentences. At the time of our audit, a new facility, Makigiarvik, was under construction. Nunavut also had five operational outpost camps at the time of our audit, where inmates can serve part of their sentence (Exhibit 1).

3. According to the Corrections Act and its regulations, the Department, through the Corrections Division, is responsible for the administration of the correctional facilities, including their safe and secure operation. The Department is also responsible for providing programs that offer treatment and training to inmates with a view to their rehabilitation. Mental health services for inmates are governed by the Mental Health Act (1988). Wardens in correctional facilities are responsible for ensuring that psychological services are offered to inmates.

4. Corrections is a significant issue in Nunavut. According to Statistics Canada, the territory’s 2013 crime rate was the second-highest in the country. Departmental data shows there were 658 adult male admissions to correctional facilities in the 2013–14 fiscal year, including 433 at the Baffin Correctional Centre and 126 at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. The figures include both remanded and sentenced inmates as well as those transferred from other facilities. The vast majority of male inmates in Nunavut are Inuit.

5. In the 2013–14 fiscal year, the Department allocated more than $32 million (32 percent of its budget) to the Corrections Division. The allocation included almost $22 million for uses directly related to custodial sentences. During that fiscal year, the Department spent $10.5 million to operate the Baffin Correctional Centre and $6.7 million to operate the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. In 2013, the Corrections Division had 190 full-time permanent employees, with 60 working at the Baffin Correctional Centre and 45 working at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, the two largest facilities.

6. One of the Department’s goals is to have enough space to house all of Nunavut’s inmates within the territory, but over the last 15 years, Nunavut’s capacity to house male inmates has not kept up with the incarceration rate. Between 2001 and 2011, the average number of Nunavummiut men incarcerated across Canada rose from 90 to 147. In 2011, there were 103 beds in Nunavut’s correctional facilities for men. The Department pays for some of Nunavut’s inmates to be housed outside the territory through shared services agreements. In the 2012–13 fiscal year, an average of 33 adult male inmates from Nunavut were incarcerated outside the territory. Since 2010, the Department of Justice has built two new facilities for adult inmates: the Nunavut Women’s Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility for men. In addition, Makigiarvik (for men) is currently under construction.

7. Nunavut continues to face significant social challenges, including housing shortages, residual trauma from the residential school system, a high suicide rate, and low educational achievements. Research has linked mental health challenges faced by Nunavummiut to substance abuse, which in turn is linked to the committal of crimes.

Focus of the audit

8. This audit focused on whether the Nunavut Department of Justice was meeting its key responsibilities for inmates within the corrections system. We audited whether the Department of Justice:

• adequately planned for and operated facilities to house inmates, and
• adequately managed inmates in compliance with key rehabilitation and reintegration requirements.

9. This audit is important because crime is a significant issue in Nunavut. Since 2001, crime rates and inmate populations have increased substantially. The corrections system plays a critical role in protecting the public by supervising offenders detained in custody, with a view to their rehabilitation.

10. We did not examine court services, sentencing decisions, community corrections, the management of inmates outside the territory, or community justice programs. We also did not audit the management of youth or women in custody.

11. More details about the audit objectives, scope, approach, and criteria are in About the Audit at the end of this report.

Findings, Recommendations, and Responses

Facility management

12. Overall, we found that the Department of Justice has not adequately met key responsibilities for its management of correctional facilities in Nunavut. The Department has known for almost two decades that it has critical correctional facility needs and has taken some steps to address these needs through the construction of the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility and Makigiarvik, at a combined cost of approximately $53 million. While these facilities will provide some relief of overcrowding, they do not address the territory’s most critical facility needs: the lack of appropriate space (including the need for maximum-security space) and the poor condition of the Baffin Correctional Centre. Issues at this facility include holes in walls, the presence of mould, non-compliance with the National Fire Code, and the housing of inmates with medium- and maximum-security ratings in a minimum-security facility—all of which continue to put the safety and security of inmates and staff at risk.

13. This is important because, under the Corrections Act and regulations, the Department has a responsibility for ensuring the safe and secure operation of correctional facilities, as part of its mandate to treat inmates while protecting the community. The Department has key obligations for ensuring that inmates are appropriately placed and supervised in support of their rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.

14. Nunavut’s core correctional facility, the Baffin Correctional Centre, opened almost three decades ago in 1986. Since 1998, the number of violent crimes in Nunavut has been substantially higher than the Canadian average. Serious concerns have been raised about Nunavut’s core correctional facility, including by the federal Office of the Correctional Investigator. Federally, the Office of the Correctional Investigator acts as an ombudsman for offenders. In early 2013, after the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility opened, the Office of the Correctional Investigator agreed to the Corrections Division’s request to review the Baffin Correctional Centre’s infrastructure and functionality from a human rights perspective. The Office concluded that consistent with numerous previous reports by internal and external bodies, the centre’s physical infrastructure was not safe for either inmates or staff, and hampered the Corrections Division’s ability to fulfill its mandate. The Office’s report called for the centre to be closed and replaced by a new facility or facilities.

The Department of Justice has not addressed its most critical facility needs

15. We found that the Department of Justice has been aware of critical deficiencies at its core correctional facility, the Baffin Correctional Centre, for many years. Despite this, the Department invested funds to construct the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility and Makigiarvik, which will provide some relief of overcrowding but which does not address the territory’s most critical facility needs: the lack of appropriate space (including the need for maximum-security space) and the poor condition of the Baffin Correctional Centre. We were not provided with a documented rationale supporting the approach the Department took.

16. Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses problems identified, plans to address facility needs, actions taken, the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, Makigiarvik, and planned renovations to the Baffin Correctional Centre.

17. This finding matters because critical facility needs of Nunavut’s current and future inmates remain unaddressed. For example, overcrowding continues at the Baffin Correctional Centre, with related safety and security risks, and space is lacking for maximum-security inmates. It is important that the Department have a documented rationale to support its capital investments. Without this, a systematic approach is not in place to address the territory’s most critical correctional facility needs.

18. Further, under the Corrections Act, the Corrections Division is responsible for providing for the safe custody and detention of inmates in correctional facilities.

19. Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 48.

20. What we examined. We examined whether the Department of Justice had assessed its current and future facility needs for accommodating inmates and whether the Department had developed adequate plans to meet those needs.

21. Problems identified. We found that the Department has been aware of critical deficiencies at the Baffin Correctional Centre for many years. The centre has been the subject of studies and reports dating back to 1996, including a report from the Office of the Correctional Investigator. These reports have highlighted operational limitations and safety and security concerns for the centre’s inmates and staff, including

• overcrowding;
• inability to separate inmates of different security levels, including those on remand;
• lack of basic security requirements for medium- and maximum-security inmates;
• lack of programming space;
• housing of inmates in the gymnasium;
• building deficiencies, including holes in the walls;
• inability to properly disinfect cells, toilets, and showers;
• the presence of mould and poor air quality; and
• non-compliance with the National Fire Code.

22. The Department of Justice has studied issues related to correctional facilities for several years. It hired a consultant to prepare a strategic plan for corrections, which was completed in 2002. Over the next 11 years, the same consultant prepared several other reports related to correctional facilities, which according to the Department was at a cost of approximately $400,000. In 2006 and 2007, reports from the consultant noted chronic deficiencies at the Baffin Correctional Centre. In 2012, the consultant prepared a Nunavut Correctional Facilities Strategy and advised how to move forward with facility planning. The consultant recommended construction of a 160-bed core facility for men containing smaller units in a range of security classifications, including remand and maximum-security beds, to better manage the occupants.

23. Plans to address facility needs. The Department’s 2006–07 fiscal year capital planning documents set out to fund new facilities for inmates. The plans included a new 20- to 24-bed healing lodge in the Kivalliq region, as well as replacement of the Baffin Correctional Centre with a 72-bed facility in Iqaluit, including units for remand, maximum-security, and medium- or minimum-security inmates. The two proposed facilities were planned in accordance with the advice from the consultant hired to study facility needs.

24. Actions taken. We found that the Department identified actions to address critical facility needs. However, a different approach was taken that did not fully address these needs. The Department could not provide us with documentation to explain why there was a change in direction. The actions that were ultimately taken included

• building the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility,
• building Makigiarvik, and
• proposing to fund a study to examine the feasibility of renovating the Baffin Correctional Centre.

25. Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. The Rankin Inlet Healing Facility opened in January 2013. According to departmental data, it was built at a cost of approximately $37 million. This was covered by funds identified for the replacement of the Baffin Correctional Centre, which never occurred.

26. The Rankin Inlet Healing Facility has 48 beds for men: 32 beds for medium-security inmates and 16 beds for minimum-security inmates. It also has space for programs such as rehabilitation and recreation. The facility houses remanded and convicted inmates together. We were not provided with a documented rationale for building a combined minimum- and medium-security facility. The Rankin Inlet Healing Facility will help to alleviate pressure by housing some minimum- and medium-security inmates, but it does not provide space to properly house maximum-security inmates—a need identified as long ago as 1996.

27. Makigiarvik. The Department initially planned to build a temporary correctional facility as a short-term solution to overcrowding at the Baffin Correctional Centre. The aim was to lessen strain on Nunavut’s correctional system until the Baffin Correctional Centre could be thoroughly upgraded and a new permanent maximum-security facility could be built in Iqaluit.

28. The temporary correctional facility was intended to be in use for up to 10 years, housing 44 to 50 minimum-security inmates full-time. The facility would then be converted into space for offices, storage, and inmate recreation and programs. During the design phase, it was determined that the northern climate posed risks to building a temporary structure. As a result, the plan for a temporary 10-year solution to overcrowding became the permanent overcrowding relief structure, with a lifespan of 30 years. It was later named Makigiarvik.

29. The estimated cost of building Makigiarvik is approximately $16 million. It is to accommodate 48 minimum-security inmates, including those with higher mental health needs. The decision to house only minimum-security inmates was based on funding constraints. Like the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, Makigiarvik will help to alleviate pressure by housing some minimum-security inmates but it does not provide space for maximum-security inmates.

30. The two new facilities, Makigiarvik and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, will offset some of the deficiencies identified at the Baffin Correctional Centre (Exhibit 2). However, they do not fully address the projected capacity needs of Nunavut’s correctional facilities. In 2012, the Department predicted that Nunavut would need 268 correctional facility beds by 2026. Even with the 96 additional beds at Makigiarvik and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, the territory will still lack approximately 70 beds. In this situation, the Government of Nunavut will have to continue paying for other jurisdictions to house some of the territory’s inmates. This option is feasible only if other jurisdictions continue to have space for Nunavut inmates.

31. Planned renovations to the Baffin Correctional Centre. The Department did not replace the Baffin Correctional Centre, as set out in its 2006–07 fiscal year capital planning document. Further, the proposal for a $300,000 study to look at modernizing, expanding, and possibly replacing the Baffin Correctional Centre was removed from the Department’s 2010–11 fiscal year capital estimates by the Legislative Assembly.

32. The Department of Justice is currently proposing renovations to the Baffin Correctional Centre to make it suitable for maximum-security inmates and to address ongoing structural deficiencies. The Department estimates that it would cost approximately $8.8 million to bring the centre into compliance with the National Fire Code and other safety codes. However, the Department has not yet estimated the cost of addressing the need for maximum-security space at the centre.

33. At the time of our audit, no funds had been approved to renovate the Baffin Correctional Centre. We found that the Department has not yet developed a plan for carrying out the renovations while still housing inmates at the centre. We also found no plan for building maximum-security space to house Nunavut inmates.

Housing inmates at the Baffin Correctional Centre compromises the security and safety of inmates and staff

34. We found that the Department’s housing of inmates at its core correctional facility compromised the security and safety of inmates and facility staff:

• The Department has not been housing inmates at the Baffin Correctional Centre according to their security ratings, as required by its own directives. The centre is a minimum-security facility that cannot properly house inmates with a medium- or maximum-security rating.

Segregation—Isolation of an individual from the general inmate population. This measure may be taken to deal with a disciplinary infraction or for administrative reasons due to security concerns.

• The Department did not adequately monitor whether key requirements for inmates in segregation were followed, or whether facility management was controlling contraband at the Baffin Correctional Centre.
• Facility management has not developed the required security plans for the Baffin Correctional Centre, or conducted the required formal security reviews of the facility.
• Critical deficiencies identified in fire inspections of the Baffin Correctional Centre have yet to be addressed.
• Facility management at the Baffin Correctional Centre did not conduct the required evacuation drills.

35. Our analysis supporting these findings presents what we examined and discusses security levels and remanded inmates, surveillance, placement of inmates in segregation, contraband, security reviews and contingency planning, identified safety and security deficiencies, and emergency evacuation drills.

36. This finding matters because the Department has a responsibility under the Corrections Act to provide for the safe custody of inmates in correctional centres. It also has responsibility for housing inmates according to specific security requirements, and for ensuring the safety and security of inmates and staff. Mixing of inmates is a security concern. The practice increases the risk that inmates will be exposed to violence. Given the nature of correctional facilities, inmates are vulnerable and depend on the Department to comply with the policies and procedures that protect their safety and security, especially during emergencies.

37. Our recommendations in these areas of examination appear at paragraphs 48, 58, 59, 66, and 69.

38. What we examined. We examined whether the Department of Justice had monitored compliance with selected security policies and procedures. We also examined compliance with selected security requirements and the way related information was used.

39. Further, we examined whether the Department of Justice had defined roles and responsibilities related to fire and health inspections by authorities, whether the Department knew that these inspections were carried out, and whether facility management followed up on or addressed recommendations made in the inspections or other safety reports. We also examined whether the Department had defined roles and responsibilities related to fire and evacuation drills, whether it knew that facility management was complying with requirements to conduct these drills, and whether facility management carried out the required fire and evacuation drills.

40. Security levels and remanded inmates. We found that the Department’s housing of inmates at the Baffin Correctional Centre compromised the security and safety of inmates and facility staff. Inmates are to be assessed for their security ratings when they enter the facility. From our review of a sample of 21 inmates at the centre, we found that this was done for the majority of inmates we examined. However, we found that the Department was not housing inmates at the centre according to their security ratings, as required by its own directives. From our review, we found that only one inmate at the centre was placed according to his security rating (minimum) after his initial assessment.

41. The Baffin Correctional Centre can only appropriately house inmates with a minimum security rating because it is a minimum-security facility not properly constructed to house any inmates with medium- or maximum-security ratings. This includes inmates on remand who, according to the centre’s corrections directives, are to be classified as maximum-security inmates on intake.

42. The corrections directives also state that an inmate on remand should be mixed with sentenced inmates only if the remanded inmate signs a waiver agreeing to this. We found that remanded inmates were not held separately from sentenced inmates and that the required waivers were not used. The Office of the Correctional Investigator has noted that the housing of remanded and sentenced inmates together is a poor correctional practice.

43. Further, we found that overcrowding makes it difficult to separate inmates. According to the Department’s inmate count for mid-October 2013, approximately one quarter of the inmates housed at the Baffin Correctional Centre received a maximum-security rating. Mixing inmates of different security levels increases the risk that non-violent inmates will be exposed to violent inmates. To address these risks, inmates are moved among sections of the facility on a case-by-case basis, depending on their security level and behaviour, as well as on relationships with other inmates. Department officials told us that the constant need to juggle inmate placement diverts staff members’ time from other matters, such as case management.

44. Inmates have raised the concern to facility management that mixing those requiring protective custody with the general inmate population exposes them to the risk of physical violence. Facility management noted that mixing occurs as a result of overcrowding.

45. The number of incidents at the Baffin Correctional Centre has risen over the years. For example, physical assaults on inmates or staff or visitors rose from 57 in the 2002–03 fiscal year to 185 in the 2012–13 fiscal year. The number of disrespectful or disruptive behaviour incidents also rose, from 119 in the 2002–03 fiscal year to 159 in the 2012–13 fiscal year.

46. The way inmates are housed at the Baffin Correctional Centre limits the Department’s ability to conduct the case management of inmates in the facility (paragraphs 114 to 144).

47. Appropriately housing medium- and maximum-security inmates is a legal obligation of the Department of Justice. Options to fulfill this obligation include constructing the required space in Nunavut or contracting with other jurisdictions. The Office of the Auditor General recognizes that appropriately housing medium- and maximum-security inmates will require significant financial resources.

48. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should acquire sufficient maximum-security beds and also ensure that medium-security inmates and those on remand are properly housed, either by contracting with other jurisdictions or by constructing in Nunavut.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Makigiarvik facility is on track to open in spring 2015 and although it will not have any maximum-security capacity, it is an initial step to increase overall correctional space.

Planning is under way to identify the viability and needs of incarceration types: maximum and medium security, as well as remand. This evaluation will update previous evaluations by specifically addressing the requirement to develop maximum-security bed space and by assessing the viability of the Baffin Correctional Centre moving forward.

The results of this evaluation are set for completion in April 2015, which will allow the Department to make informed strategic decisions on test and design options for the 2015–16 fiscal year based on the current and long-term correctional service needs of Nunavummiut, including the appropriate placement of incarcerated people within Nunavut, or in other jurisdictions, as necessary.

The ultimate goal is to acquire maximum-security space.

49. Surveillance. To ensure a safe and secure environment, the Corrections Division has procedures for inmate surveillance, including procedures related to inmates in segregation. We randomly selected five days in the 2012–13 fiscal year and five days in the 2013–14 fiscal year. For those days, we reviewed surveillance logs for inmates both in the general population and in segregation at the Baffin Correctional Centre. We found that staff members had performed the required inmate counts.

50. Placement of inmates in segregation. Nine of the 21 inmates whose files we reviewed at the Baffin Correctional Centre had been placed in segregation at least once. For these inmates, we found that the Department did not adequately monitor whether key requirements for those in segregation were followed (Exhibit 3). For example, inmates in segregation for longer than a week are to have a weekly review to determine whether segregation is still appropriate. There was no evidence of weekly reviews in the file sample we examined. This included seven placements in segregation for 10 days or more.

51. According to the corrections directives, inmates should not be held in disciplinary segregation for longer than 15 days. We found no cases in our sample where they were held for longer.

52. Spending long periods in segregation entails risks to an inmate’s mental and physical health. It is important to monitor whether key requirements for those in segregation are followed. If not, facility management does not have assurance that inmates are managed safely and in accordance with the corrections directives and standing orders. For 3 of the 6 inmates in our sample who spent longer than a week in administrative segregation, we found none of the three key requirements were met (justification, authorization, and weekly review). Our recommendation regarding this finding is in paragraph 58.

53. Contraband. The control of contraband is essential for the safety of staff and inmates. There were 203 contraband incidents discovered at the Baffin Correctional Centre during the 2012–13 and 2013–14 fiscal years, or an average of 8 incidents a month. The incidents involved different types of contraband and varying levels of seriousness. The presence of contraband in a facility can lead to security incidents, such as fires. On 12 November 2012, two fires were started by inmates in the Baffin Correctional Centre.

54. The condition of the Baffin Correctional Centre has elevated the risk of contraband entering the facility. We found that security issues have been raised with the Department by both Corrections Division officials and external bodies, such as consultants and the Office of the Correctional Investigator. They noted issues such as the need to repair holes in the facility’s walls, upgrade the security video camera system, and build an additional fence around the inmates’ outdoor area. The only action taken to date has been to patch interior holes with plywood, which itself has been identified as a fire hazard. The other identified issues remain to be addressed.

55. We found that the Department did not adequately monitor whether facility management was controlling contraband at the Baffin Correctional Centre. The centre’s operating procedures require security staff to search cells and rooms during each shift. Facility management informed us that searches were instead conducted irregularly, with the goal of searching cells and rooms once a month. The searches also were not documented, as required by the centre’s operating procedures. Facility officials explained that the required searches were not carried out because of the additional staff needed to do so.

56. To minimize contraband entering the facility, we found that the visitation room was relocated and reconfigured to limit person-to-person contact during visits. The visitation policy was also revised. We observed an initial decline in contraband incidents after the visitation room was relocated and reconfigured but contraband incident rates rose again after a few months.

57. Although the Department had information on the number of contraband-related incidents, it had not analyzed related trends, such as the type of contraband, its seriousness, or how it entered the facility. Without such information, the Department was not fully informed about where to try to address the centre’s contraband challenges, or about the full impact of contraband in facilities and on inmates. For example, the presence of some types of contraband, such as drugs, in a facility can hamper the Department’s efforts to support inmates trying to overcome addictions.

58. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should exercise oversight to ensure that facility management complies with its policies, directives, and operating procedures for inmate segregation and for searches of cells and rooms.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Department will initiate an organizational and functional staffing review of the Corrections Division before June 2015 in order to identify gaps in service and capacity.

The Department will establish a compliance- and oversight-oriented position within the Corrections Division, pending staffing analysis and funding approval. Compliance and oversight positions are found in the majority of Canadian correctional services. This position will help ensure compliance with policies and procedures, as well as provide follow-up and conduct investigations as and when required.

The Department is in the process of rewriting its corrections legislation (the Nunavut Corrections Act and Regulations) in order to modernize and establish the founding document. A review of current policy, directives, and operating procedures will begin in early 2015, which will coincide with the review of the Corrections Act.

59. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should analyze trends related to contraband, including the types of contraband and how it enters the facility.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Department has been documenting contraband in the computer-based Corrections Offender Management System (COMS) since 2000. A test of an updated version of COMS is set to begin before the end of January 2015. This version will have the capacity to track and extract contraband data to analyze trends. Once a successful test environment has been established, a permanent version is set to be implemented. Once the Department has established this capacity, the Department will analyze contraband trends.

60. Security reviews and contingency planning. We found that facility management was not meeting key security and safety requirements. It had not developed the required security plans for the Baffin Correctional Centre or conducted the required formal security reviews of the facility. The plans and reviews are intended to improve the facility’s security. Department officials informed us that the risks of not carrying out formal security reviews are addressed by performing informal daily and weekly reviews of the facilities, as well as investigating incidents. However, the informal reviews do not satisfy the requirements of the corrections directives. We found that contingency plans were in place.

61. Identified safety and security deficiencies. Under the corrections directives, the facility management is responsible for ensuring that the authorities conduct annual fire and health inspections, and that identified deficiencies are followed up and addressed. We found that there were critical deficiencies identified in the fire inspections for Baffin Correctional Centre that had not been addressed. For example, there was no emergency lighting in the gymnasium, where overcrowding required inmates to be housed regularly.

62. Some of the Baffin Correctional Centre’s unaddressed deficiencies had been identified repeatedly in inspections. Six deficiencies had been outstanding for more than two years. They included holes in walls requiring repair, as well as the use of combustible material (plywood) to cover the walls and ceiling.

63. Two external firms carried out assessments of the Baffin Correctional Centre in 2010 and 2012. Deficiencies were found, such as a lack of proper fire separations between various areas and unreliable security systems. (Problems included the systems’ wiring, door lock mechanisms, and control panels.)

64. We found that most of the major deficiencies identified remained unaddressed, including the lack of proper fire separations and unreliable security systems. We found that no funds had been approved for the Department of Justice to renovate the Baffin Correctional Centre (paragraph 33).

65. At the time of our audit, the Baffin Correctional Centre was overcrowded. It was being used to house a larger number of inmates than planned, of a security level for which the facility was not designed. These factors contributed to the building’s deterioration and an increased level of stress among staff and inmates.

66. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should work with the Department of Community and Government Services to ensure that corrective action is taken on all non-compliance issues identified at the Baffin Correctional Centre in fire inspection reports and external reports.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Department is working with the Department of Community and Government Services (CGS) to correct all non-compliance issues identified in fire inspection reports and external reports, particularly for the Baffin Correctional Centre. The Department will continue to work with CGS to adhere to regular inspections and maintenance plans. Funding and planning is under way to identify the viability and needs in light of the territory’s current infrastructure capacity, including its deficiencies. The results of this evaluation will be available in April 2015 and will provide options on the most effective and efficient ways to address current gaps and deficiencies.

67. Emergency evacuation drills. We found that facility management at the Baffin Correctional Centre did not conduct the required quarterly emergency evacuation drills in the 2012–13 or 2013–14 fiscal years. Further, Department officials told us that no drills were performed between October 2007 and January 2011. We were told that drills were suspended because of the security risks due to overcrowding in the facility. Regular emergency evacuation drills are critical to the safety of inmates and staff. There have been three fires at the centre since 2005.

68. Due to the serious nature of our findings, we sent a letter to the Acting Deputy Minister of the Department of Justice in September 2014. We did this to raise concerns that required immediate attention about conducting emergency evacuation drills, and to provide the Department with an early opportunity to take the necessary actions to ensure that its obligations were properly addressed. The Department responded, acknowledging the importance of the situation and setting out the actions it plans to implement to correct the deficiencies.

69. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should ensure that facility management at the Baffin Correctional Centre conducts emergency evacuation drills, as required. It should document these drills and take any corrective actions necessary.

The Department’s response. Agreed. Since being notified of this by the Office of the Auditor General, the Department has taken steps to ensure that these drills at Baffin Correctional Centre occur and will continue to occur on a regular basis in every facility. In November 2014, an electronic tracking and scheduling system was put in place whereby advance notifications for fire/evacuation drills are sent to each facility. Progress is monitored to ensure that evacuation drills are performed and documented by a set time.

A memorandum with the policies was provided in January 2015 to managers and wardens on the requirement and importance of conducting mandated evacuation drills. All correctional facilities in Nunavut are equipped with standardized copies of evacuation report forms. Any deficiencies identified in the completed drill reports will be corrected.

In 2015, the Department will seek to establish a compliance-oriented position for additional assurance through increased oversight capacity in this area.

The Rankin Inlet Healing Facility was not fully prepared when it opened, and issues at the facility compromise the security and safety of inmates and staff

70. We found that the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility was not fully prepared to carry out inmate assessments when it opened, and facility management had not yet defined its vision and operating procedures as a healing facility. In the meantime, the facility adopted the operating procedures of the Baffin Correctional Centre, which is not considered to be a healing facility. In addition, we found that the security and safety of inmates and staff at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility were compromised:

• The Department did not adequately monitor whether key requirements were followed for inmates in segregation.
• While deficiencies identified in fire prevention and health inspections had been addressed, the facility management had not developed security plans or conducted the required formal security review and fire drills.

71. Our analysis supporting these findings presents what we examined and discusses accepting inmates, operating procedures, security levels and remanded inmates, inmate segregation, and other safety and security requirements.

72. This finding matters because the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility was intended to address some of Nunavut’s correctional facility needs. Since it was not fully prepared when it opened, the facility has had a limited impact on addressing the territory’s correctional facility needs.

73. Further, this finding matters because the Department of Justice has a responsibility under the Corrections Act to provide for the safe custody of inmates in correctional centres. It is also responsible for housing inmates according to specific security requirements, and for ensuring the safety and security of inmates and staff. Given the nature of correctional facilities, inmates are vulnerable and depend on the Department to comply with policies and procedures that protect their safety and security, especially during emergencies.

74. Our recommendations in this area of examination appear at paragraphs 79, 82, 85, and 87.

75. What we examined. We examined whether the Department knew if the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility was meeting the needs it was intended to fulfill. For the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, we examined the same security and safety requirements discussed in paragraphs 38 and 39.

76. Accepting inmates. The Rankin Inlet Healing Facility opened in January 2013 with 48 minimum- or medium-security beds for adult male inmates. We found that the facility had been underutilized since it opened. For example, according to departmental data, the facility housed 19 inmates in July 2013 and 34 inmates in mid-January 2014. Since the facility opened, the Baffin Correctional Centre has remained overcrowded. A year after the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility opened, the Baffin Correctional Centre housed 80 inmates—118 percent of the centre’s rated capacity of 68 beds.

77. We found that the Department faced staffing challenges when the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility opened. This included challenges related to the availability of staff housing. We were informed that the facility had been slow to accept inmates, partly because it lacked a full complement of trained staff on opening.

78. We found that the facility still did not have a full complement of trained staff. There was no trained staff to carry out inmate assessments, and staff required more case management training. Because of the lack of trained staff at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, inmates were assessed at the Baffin Correctional Centre and then the centre’s staff recommended inmates to be housed at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. Facility management informed us that the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility is able to refuse inmates from the Baffin Correctional Centre and has done so in the past. The facility was not accepting inmates who were difficult to deal with or had high needs. Such inmates continued to be housed at the Baffin Correctional Centre. These issues contributed to the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility being of limited help in reducing overcrowding at the Baffin Correctional Centre.

79. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should examine how the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility can better address the correctional facility capacity needs of the territory and ensure that facility staff are better trained to do so.

The Department’s response. Agreed. To more efficiently address the demand for correctional space and service needs of the Kivalliq region, the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility now accepts direct admissions from Rankin Inlet and surrounding communities.

Direct admissions to the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility will be made eligible based on the presence of a recent assessment classification or in the circumstance of being held in transit to Baffin Correctional Centre for initial assessment.

A management conference will convene in early 2015 during which the Department will develop the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility’s vision and mission, which will include discussions on possible actions to ensure the facility is used to its full potential, including the opportunity of adding classification assessment capacity to the facility.

In December 2014, a case management committee was struck and tasked with identifying required training and the development of a training manual. The implementation of an updated version of the Department’s computer-based Corrections Offender Management System (COMS) will allow for increased capacity to track and extract employee training data. Once this system is developed, it will be used to track individual training and ensure staff participates in all requisite training.

80. Operating procedures. Establishing operating procedures is a key task when setting up a correctional facility. According to departmental data, the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility was constructed at a cost of approximately $37 million as a healing facility. However, we found that its management was unaware of how the Department was defining the vision for the facility, and had not itself defined that vision.

81. We also found that the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility did not have its own standing orders when it opened. Instead, it operated with, and eventually adopted, the standing orders in place at the Baffin Correctional Centre. As a result, the facility followed the same procedures as the Baffin Correctional Centre. This could limit opportunities for new approaches and training specifically for a healing facility.

82. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should ensure that there is a documented vision for the operation of the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility and that this guides the operation of the facility.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Department has scheduled a management conference for early 2015, during which the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility’s vision and mission statements will be developed and defined. As we move forward, these statements will be reviewed to ensure they reflect the needs of the territory.

83. Security levels and remanded inmates. As we mention in paragraph 78, difficult inmates were not accepted into the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility and we were not informed of any maximum-security inmates being accepted, with the exception of those on remand. We were told that the facility has begun accepting remanded inmates directly, rather than from other correctional facilities. According to the corrections directives, remanded inmates should be classified as maximum-security inmates on intake. We also found that, similar to the Baffin Correctional Centre, the Department did not request the required waiver be signed when remanded inmates were housed with sentenced inmates.

84. Inmate segregation. According to our review of 12 files at the facility, three inmates had been in administrative or disciplinary segregation at least once. We found that facility management did not always follow the procedures for the placement and surveillance of inmates in segregation. In our sample, we found the following:

• Facility management could not provide us with any evidence that those who were in segregation were observed as required.
• Only one of the four placements into administrative segregation was authorized by the warden, as required.
• No weekly review was conducted for the one inmate serving more than a week in administrative segregation.

Consequently, management did not have assurance that inmates are managed safely and in accordance with their rights under the directives.

85. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should provide oversight of facility management to ensure compliance with its policies, directives, and operating procedures for inmate segregation.

The Department’s response. Agreed. By the end of March 2015, a memorandum with the relevant policy will be released to all facilities, detailing correctional best practices in segregation.

The process of reviewing all correctional directives and policies will begin in early 2015.

To ensure that these important policies are adhered to, the Department will be moving to establish a compliance position. This position will help provide oversight in correctional management policies, particularly with respect to segregation.

86. Other safety and security requirements. We found that all the deficiencies identified in fire prevention and health inspections conducted at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility in the 2013–14 fiscal year have been addressed. However, we found that key security and safety requirements were not met at the facility (Exhibit 4). For example, no quarterly emergency evacuation drills were conducted in the 2013–14 fiscal year. This is important because inmates of a correctional facility are vulnerable and depend on the Department of Justice to comply with the policies and procedures that protect their safety and security, especially in emergencies. As mentioned in paragraph 68, we sent a letter to the Acting Deputy Minister of the Department of Justice in September 2014 to raise concerns requiring immediate attention that related to conducting emergency evacuation drills. The Department responded, acknowledging the importance of the situation and set out the actions it plans to implement to correct the deficiencies.

87. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should ensure that facility management at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility conducts emergency evacuation drills, as required. It should document these drills and take any corrective actions necessary.

The Department’s response. Agreed. Since being notified of this by the Office of the Auditor General, fire and evacuation drills at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility will occur on a quarterly basis.

The Department has taken steps to ensure that these drills will continue to occur on a quarterly basis. An electronic tracking and scheduling system was put in place whereby advance notifications for fire/evacuation drills are sent to each facility. Progress is monitored to ensure that evacuation drills are performed and documented by a set time.

A memorandum, with an attached copy of relevant policies, was circulated in December 2014 to all facilities on the requirement and importance of conducting mandated evacuation drills. All correctional facilities in Nunavut will be equipped with standardized copies of evacuation schedule forms.

In 2015, the Department will be moving to establish a compliance-oriented position for additional assurance through increased oversight capacity in this area.

The Department is not adequately managing its staffing of the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility

88. We found that the Department of Justice was not adequately managing its staffing of the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility:

• The Department continued to rely on casual staff and overtime to address staffing needs at the two facilities.
• The Department had not adequately monitored or managed use of overtime in the facilities.
• The Department had begun to track the training received by staff, but there were gaps in the Department’s tracking data. Even without complete data, Department officials were aware that many correctional staff members had not received key mandatory training.

89. Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses staffing, overtime, and training.

90. This finding matters because staffing practices have constrained the Department’s ability to meet its obligations under the Corrections Act. The Department was diverting funds away from some of its responsibilities, such as programming, so that it could cover the costs of casual staff and overtime to address staffing shortfalls.

91. Our recommendations in this area of examination appear at paragraphs 100 and 102.

92. What we examined. We examined whether the Department had identified the required number and types of staff for the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, and whether it addressed any identified gaps in staffing. We also examined whether the Department had assessed overtime usage and taken steps to address any unacceptable overtime usage. We further examined whether the Department tracked whether staff had taken the key mandatory training.

93. Staffing. We found that the Department of Justice had not performed a comprehensive analysis, detailing both the programming and security staffing needs for the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. The Department had identified the required number and types of staff for both facilities based on operational experience.

94. Prior to the opening of the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility in January 2013, the Department undertook a recruitment campaign to fill various positions at the facility, but Department officials informed us that several of these positions have become vacant. To fill these positions as well as vacancies at the Baffin Correctional Centre, the Department relied on casual staff or overtime. While this is a short-term solution to fill vacancies, it is a costly solution in the long term. Employees are compensated for the time they work over their regular hours and casual staffing can add training and administrative costs. The Department noted that expenditures on overtime and casual staff were reducing the amount of funding available for programming.

95. In 2013, the Department prepared a business case outlining the need for an additional 42 positions for the Corrections Division and its facilities. As noted above, this was not based on a comprehensive analysis. The business case identified the challenges faced by the Division including overcrowding at the Baffin Correctional Centre and staff shortages contributing to rising overtime and casual costs. Among the positions were 29 for Makigiarvik, including 24 correctional caseworkers, a psychiatric nurse, a classification officer, a program facilitator, and two cooks. Additional administrative staff and front-line workers at other facilities were also identified, including an investigations and standards officer for the Corrections Division. This position would be responsible for upholding correctional standards in all facilities. We found the Financial Management Board approved 26 of the 42 positions identified by the Corrections Division: 24 correctional caseworkers and two cooks for Makigiarvik.

96. The Department also requested $2.8 million to cover a shortfall in salary expenses for overtime and casual staff in the 2013–14 fiscal year. These funds were approved by the Financial Management Board. At this time, the Department was also directed to do a review of its correctional facility operational and staffing policies and procedures. To date, this review has not been completed. Until its correctional facilities have a sufficient number of full-time permanent staff, the Department plans to continue requesting funding for casual staff and overtime. Funding to cover casual staff and overtime is not dealing with the cause of the shortfall, which is the lack of dedicated, full-time permanent staff. Our recommendation regarding this issue is in paragraph 100.

97. Overtime. The Department has incurred significant financial costs because of its reliance on overtime. In the 2013–14 fiscal year, overtime costs represented 13 percent of the operating budget at the Baffin Correctional Centre and 8 percent of the operating budget at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. The Department was aware of the reasons for relying on overtime in its facilities. Provisions in the existing collective agreement, the lack of sufficient full-time permanent staff, and the operational necessity of staffing a correctional facility 24 hours a day are all factors that make controlling overtime a challenge.

98. Nevertheless, some factors were within the Department’s control—for example, planning to accommodate training and leave. We found that the Department had not adequately monitored or managed overtime use in its facilities. The Department had done little to examine how it could manage its overtime needs and curtail related expenditures. It had not analyzed its data or established an acceptable level of overtime use in its facilities.

99. We analyzed overtime paid to staff at the Baffin Correctional Centre and Rankin Inlet Healing Facility for the 2012–13 and 2013–14 fiscal years. We found that the Corrections Division spent $1.1 million in the 2012–13 fiscal year and $2.0 million in the 2013–14 fiscal year on overtime at the two facilities alone. In those two facilities, overtime payments increased the income of correctional employees by an average of 20 percent in the 2013–14 fiscal year. Overtime usage was especially high at the Baffin Correctional Centre, accounting for a 50-percent increase in earnings of 16 front-line employees during the 2013–14 fiscal year. Within that group, 5 employees saw their income rise by more than 90 percent, almost doubling as a result of overtime payments.

100. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should

• conduct a comprehensive analysis of its staffing needs for the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility;
• fill vacant positions with the required mix of full-time, permanent, and casual staff to address facility needs; and
• determine an acceptable level of overtime usage and, relying on available data, monitor and manage usage to achieve that goal.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Corrections Division will work with the Department of Finance to undergo a comprehensive staffing analysis, including an analysis of staffing needs at each facility, initiating the evaluation before June 2015.

Starting in November 2014, the Department initiated a large-scale, multimedia recruitment campaign for the Corrections Division, focusing on beneficiary hiring and public education. By the end of 2014, the Department performed community-based outreach initiatives in Pangnirtung, Cape Dorset, Pond Inlet, Qikiqtarjuaq, and Clyde River. These outreach initiatives were very successful and the Department will expand its community-based recruitment to other communities in the future.

It is planned that in the June 2015 staffing analysis, a component will be dedicated to reviewing overtime use in Nunavut correctional facilities. Establishing additional permanent full-time staff in facilities will assist in curbing much of the current overtime expenditures.

101. Training. We found that the Department of Justice had begun to track key mandatory training received by staff but its tracking data was incomplete. Even without complete data, Department officials were aware that many correctional staff members had not received their key mandatory training. This means that correctional staff members have been working in facilities without training in first aid, mental health issues, the criminal justice system, or the proper use of force. We were informed that one major reason for this situation is that the Department has a new training regime and now considers prior training received by staff to be outdated. Officials estimated that half of correctional staff members had been trained to date, and that it will take two years before all are trained.

102. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should ensure that staff members receive their mandatory training through the development and use of an effective system of tracking the training received by facility staff.

The Department’s response. Agreed. A test of an updated version of the Department’s computer-based Corrections Offender Management System (COMS) is set to begin before the end of January 2015. This new version of this system will have the capacity to input, track, and extract employee training data. Once a successful test environment has been established, a permanent version will be implemented. This system will be used to track individual training and ensure all staff participate in requisite training.

Inmate case management

Serious case management deficiencies limit the Department’s efforts to rehabilitate inmates

103. Overall, we found that serious case management deficiencies limit the Department’s efforts to rehabilitate inmates and prepare them for release back to the community. There are significant gaps in how inmate case management is carried out at the territory’s two largest correctional facilities: the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility. Further, the way inmates are housed at the Baffin Correctional Centre, in part due to the pressures of overcrowding, limits the Department’s ability to conduct the case management of inmates within the facility.

104. In every file we examined at the two facilities, we found that plans for guiding the inmates’ rehabilitation had not been completed. Consequently, few inmates had rehabilitative programs recommended to them to help with issues such as anger management and substance abuse. In addition, plans had not been developed for their release back to their community to help them reintegrate. At both facilities, we also found that inmates had limited access to rehabilitative programs. For the inmates’ files we examined, most inmates identified as needing mental health services did not receive them. However, the smallest facility we looked at, the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre, provided an example of good inmate case management in all of these areas.

105. This is important because the Department has a legislative responsibility to provide for the correction and treatment of offenders and the protection of the community through correctional programming and support services in facilities. Lack of access to these programs and services for inmates means that many are returning to their home communities without having received the support that may have assisted them in their rehabilitation and reintegration.

106. Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses case management assessments, case plans for inmates, access to rehabilitation programs, access to mental health services, monitoring of inmates’ progress, and release planning for inmates.

107. Case management is a process that includes gathering information about an inmate, assessing his needs and risks, creating a case plan that sets expectations for behavioural change, and reviewing the inmate’s progress at regular intervals. Correctional programs are to be designed, developed, and implemented to address the needs of inmates, including the cultural and spiritual needs of Inuit residents.

108. The case management process in Nunavut facilities includes specific requirements related to

• assessment of inmates’ needs and risks,
• development of case plans for inmates,
• inmates’ access to rehabilitation programs and mental health services,
• monitoring of inmates’ progress, and
• planning for inmates’ release back into the community.

109. The case management process is required to begin at the time of admission to a facility. A case management team must work together to develop, plan, implement, and evaluate a case management plan for each inmate, on an ongoing basis. Compliance with the requirements of the Corrections Act and corrections directives is key to ensuring that inmates receive the maximum benefit from rehabilitation and reintegration efforts tailored to their risks and needs before returning to their communities. It is therefore imperative that case management requirements are met.

110. The correctional programs offered to inmates are intended to minimize the negative effects of imprisonment, help their personal development, and prepare them for successful reintegration into the community. In Nunavut, programs are to include input from community resources and Inuit elders.

111. According to Department of Justice data, 98 percent of adult male inmates in Nunavut are Inuit. In the 2013–14 fiscal year, the average age of admission was 32 years. The territory’s crime rate is among the highest in the country. In 2013, violent crimes made up 26 percent of Nunavut’s Criminal Code violations, compared with 20 percent for Canada as a whole. Nineteen percent of crimes committed in Nunavut that year involved assault. Sexual assaults were also 12 times higher than the national average. A high proportion of crimes in Nunavut involve alcohol and there is no substance abuse treatment centre currently operating in Nunavut. Because of these concerns, it is especially important for inmates to have access to the programs and support they need when in custody.

112. We reviewed 39 files, each relating to an individual inmate. Most of the 39 inmates had been incarcerated for violent offences and had substance abuse issues. Many of the inmates had been convicted of violating their probation or court orders. Almost all had been previous offenders. All inmates in our sample were Inuit.

113. Our recommendations in these areas of examination appear at paragraphs 119, 120, 124, 137, 138, and 142.

114. What we examined. We examined whether the Department followed the required processes for managing cases while the inmates were incarcerated, including whether inmates had access to programs and services that would address their needs and risks. We looked at the Department’s case management practices at the Baffin Correctional Centre, the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, and the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre by examining the files of 39 inmates who had been incarcerated at these facilities between 1 April 2012 and 31 March 2014 (Exhibit 5).

115. Conducting case management assessments. Under the Corrections Act, inmates are to have access to correctional programs aimed at their rehabilitation. Assessing inmates’ needs and risks is a key step in ensuring that they access the programs they require. We found that most inmates were sent to the Baffin Correctional Centre for assessments because staff members at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility were not trained to conduct them.

116. We found that assessments had been completed for most of the inmates in our sample. However, we found that the assessments were not conducted in a timely manner. This means that an extended period may pass before facility staff members identify programming or services to facilitate an inmate’s rehabilitation. The timing is especially critical in the case of an inmate serving a short sentence.

117. Departmental and facility management have established internal guidance for the Baffin Correctional Centre, outlining the assessment tools to be used and the related timelines. The centre’s internal guidance calls for inmates to be assessed upon sentencing. However, we found that sentenced inmates in our sample waited an average of 13 days to be assessed, and one inmate waited 36 days. In that case, the inmate served 59 days of a 90-day sentence. It is important for all inmates to be assessed as soon as possible, particularly since the average length of stay at both facilities was approximately 75 days in the 2013–14 fiscal year.

118. We also found that the Department did not use the assessment tool prescribed by the corrections directives. Staff at the Baffin Correctional Centre informed us that this is because not enough officials are trained to use it. At the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre, officials told us that they do not conduct assessments as prescribed by the corrections directives. They explained that the directives do not reflect a facility like the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre. Instead, we found that the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre followed a screening process during which a staff member gets to know the inmate to determine his suitability for admission to the facility.

119. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should update its directives and operating procedures related to case management assessments to reflect the context in which facilities operate.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Department is in the process of rewriting Nunavut’s correctional service legislation (the Nunavut Corrections Act and Regulations) in order to modernize and establish the founding document. A review of current policy, directives, and operating procedures will begin in early 2015.

While undertaking this process, the Department will produce a communication strategy to identify and then communicate changes to legislation and policy and how these changes will affect operations. The Department will circulate the communication before the changes come into force.

The strategy will also identify and provide any required specialized training related to changes in procedure.

120. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should complete assessments as soon as possible after admission to identify the programs and services required for each inmate’s rehabilitation.

The Department’s response. Agreed. Facility managers and wardens are responsible for ensuring that assessments are completed in a timely manner. A memorandum on the requirement for timeliness, along with the relevant timelines for completion of assessments, will be circulated by the end of March 2015.

A request for proposal (RFP) is being prepared to assess current programs and services in relation to incarcerated Nunavummiut’s risks and needs in Nunavut correctional facilities. This scope of the proposal will also include a review of psychological services. This RFP will be completed for submissions by early 2015.

Instating a compliance-oriented position would increase oversight capacity, including the conducting of annual audits on the completion of assessments and case management plans.

121. Completing case plans. The corrections directives require a case plan to be developed for each inmate admitted into custody (Exhibit 5). The plan is intended to guide efforts to support the inmate’s rehabilitation. We found that staff members at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility lacked training to develop case plans, which were instead completed at the Baffin Correctional Centre.

122. We found significant gaps in the plans for inmates in the Baffin Correctional Centre and Rankin Inlet Healing Facility files we reviewed. We found that none of the case plans developed at the Baffin Correctional Centre were complete and that critical elements of the plans were missing. For example, none of the plans we examined included goals to address the inmate’s needs, and only two included recommendations for programs and services to address those needs. We also found a lack of monitoring inmates’ progress against case plans (paragraph 143) and limited planning for inmates’ release (paragraph 144). This meant that inmates did not have a plan in place to help guide their rehabilitation and reintegration.

123. Further, the plans we examined were often vague and used formulated language that was identical across plans for different inmates. Department officials informed us that the plans are of limited use because they provide little information specific to the inmate.

124. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should ensure that plans to guide an inmate’s rehabilitation are completed for all inmates. The Department should also ensure that plans recommend rehabilitation programs to address the inmate’s needs and include a release plan to assist in preparing the inmate for return to the community. Progress against the case plans should be documented and monitored, and adjustments should be made as necessary.

The Department’s response. Agreed. As of December 2014, a case management committee was struck to enhance and further develop the case management process in all facilities. This includes identifying and correcting any gaps in service that result in incomplete plans and enhancing the plan’s applicability in guiding a person’s release back to the community.

The committee will develop a case management manual to distribute to staff detailing the case management process. The committee will be charged with developing and providing training associated with the new case management manual. Facility managers and wardens will be responsible for enforcing the manual’s use and for ensuring implementation.

125. Access to rehabilitation programs. The Corrections Act requires the Department of Justice to provide rehabilitative programs to inmates. Upon admission, inmates at the Baffin Correctional Centre receive a list of various programs available. This includes

• health care,
• recreation,
• chaplaincy,
• psychological counselling,
• traditional healing program,
• educational upgrading,
• anger and emotions management,
• sex offender program,
• Narcotics Anonymous,
• outpost camp program,
• Alcoholics Anonymous,
• Inuit cultural skills program,
• carving,
• grief and loss, and
• support group.

The Rankin Inlet Healing Facility is still establishing some programs but has offered others. These include an addictions program and anger management counselling. Programming at the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre focuses on establishing a structure for residents and fostering the development of life skills.

126. We found that inmates did not have adequate access to rehabilitative programs at the Baffin Correctional Centre and Rankin Inlet Healing Facility.

127. Sixty-seven percent of the inmates we examined at the Baffin Correctional Centre accessed some form of programming, although this could involve as little as a single class. Further, most inmates we reviewed at the centre were identified as having a substance abuse issue; despite this, inmates at the centre did not have access to a substance abuse program for over seven months in 2012. The program was offered twice between January and September 2014.

128. Department officials informed us that a number of factors may limit inmates’ access to programming at the Baffin Correctional Centre and Rankin Inlet Healing Facility.

• Programs are not being offered regularly at the Baffin Correctional Centre.
• Programs are not being offered at the Baffin Correctional Centre because of overcrowding.
• Programs are offered depending on staff availability.
• Programs are not available to an inmate serving a short sentence.

129. Inmate participation in programs at the Baffin Correctional Centre and Rankin Inlet Healing Facility is voluntary. Nevertheless, we found that the Department could take certain actions to improve inmates’ access to programming.

130. We found that program plans were not established for either Baffin Correctional Centre or Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, as required by the corrections directives. In addition to scheduling courses and identifying space, resources, and costs, program plans are intended to establish goals and objectives for each program and provide a measure for effectiveness. Without a program plan, including financial and human resources to provide programming to inmates, it was difficult for facility staff to monitor access and delivery.

131. We found that the facilities had schedules for some programs, but there was no overall plan for the way human and financial resources would be allocated to deliver programming to inmates. Programs sometimes could not run because of a lack of staff to facilitate them. In addition, the Department had not established a programming schedule that would best serve its inmate population. As mentioned in paragraph 117, for example, in the 2013–14 fiscal year, an inmate’s average length of stay at either the Baffin Correctional Centre or the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility was approximately 75 days; however, we found no strategy in place to ensure that programming was tailored to reflect this.

132. We also found that the Department had not assessed whether it was addressing the needs of the overall inmate population with its programming, nor had it reviewed the programs that it offers to see how much they help to rehabilitate inmates. Currently, programs at the Baffin Correctional Centre are based on existing programs or materials from external sources, but it was not clear how these have been tailored to inmates’ backgrounds.

133. We did find that the Baffin Correctional Centre had a program specifically for inmates with higher mental health needs. These inmates were housed in a separate unit in the centre and were offered a more structured environment. This was the only programming we found at the centre that was tailored to be more accessible to inmates with mental health concerns.

134. With regard to cultural programs, at the Baffin Correctional Centre, the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility, and the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre, we found that a range of cultural programs were offered to inmates. These include

• a carving program,
• the Inuit Cultural Skills Program, and
• elders’ counselling.

However, Department officials informed us that participants in the centre’s carving program often faced pressure from other inmates to smuggle in contraband when they returned to the facility. (The Office of the Correctional Investigator made the same observation.) As a result, inmates did not want to participate in the program and it was not running.

135. Inmates at the Baffin Correctional Centre and Rankin Inlet Healing Facility can also volunteer to serve part of their sentence at an outpost camp. The purpose of such a camp is to promote healing through counselling and learning traditional skills. According to departmental data, the outpost camps combined housed an average of four inmates in the 2013–14 fiscal year, reaching a peak of eight inmates in that year. At the time of our audit, there were five camps operating, with a total program budget of up to $1 million. A 2012 review of the camp facilities found that the program was not well monitored by the Department. We were informed that the Department has identified some required changes in how the outpost camp program is managed, including improving communication between the manager of the camp program, the correctional facilities, and camp operators. Department officials recently met with camp operators to discuss ways to improve the outpost camp program.

136. The corrections directives state the importance of incorporating the principles and values of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit (an Inuktitut term meaning “that which has long been known by Inuit”) into the justice system. Cultural programming is one way to achieve this goal. We noted that the corrections directives provide some guidance on incorporating cultural aspects into programming, particularly by involving elders and offering programming on the land. However, the directives contain little guidance on how Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit can be incorporated into other aspects of the corrections system.

137. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should identify the needs and risks of its inmate population. It should provide inmates with adequate access to rehabilitative programming that reflects these needs and risks.

The Department’s response. Agreed. A request for proposal (RFP) is being developed to assess current programs and services in relation to incarcerated Nunavummiut’s risks and needs in Nunavut correctional facilities. This RFP will be completed for submissions by early 2015.

138. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should update its directives and operating procedures to incorporate the principles and values of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit.

The Department’s response. Agreed. A review of current policy, directives, and operating procedures will begin in early 2015. The review process will take place with the specific intention of incorporating Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit into the directives, policy, and procedures, and consulting community stakeholders.

Updates to policy will be accompanied by a communication strategy to communicate changes to staff before they are enforced and affect operations. The Department will also identify and provide any necessary specialized training to staff related to changes.

139. Access to mental health services. We found a program in place at the Baffin Correctional Centre for inmates with higher mental health needs (see paragraph 133). Despite this, we found that inmates whose files we reviewed did not receive adequate access to mental health services. Of the 12 inmates in our sample who were identified as requiring psychological services, only 2 received referrals to the psychologist and 2 had access to a psychiatrist on one occasion. We found no evidence of whether any of these inmates met with the psychologist.

140. We also found that the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility had few staff members who can provide counselling or other support services to inmates. Staff members at these two facilities as well as the Uttaqivik Community Residential Centre told us that mental health services are inadequate, and they raised concerns about the lack of psychological support and counselling available to Nunavut inmates. There was only one psychologist in the Corrections Division. Officials at the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility told us that inmates did not have access to the psychologist but could use community supports.

141. Without mental health services, inmates’ rehabilitation efforts can be limited as the issues underlying criminal behaviour were not being addressed.

142. Recommendation. The Department of Justice should

• evaluate the way it is referring inmates for mental health services and follow up to ensure that inmates are getting the services identified and
• review and where required, increase its capacity to ensure that inmates requiring mental health services be provided with access to sufficient counselling and psychological support.

The Department’s response. Agreed. The Department is reviewing its relevant job descriptions and organizational charts to identify any gaps in service that can be immediately addressed. Any gaps identified to refocus mental health support that can be immediately addressed will be addressed.

The Department is looking to develop interdepartmental partnerships for increased resources and improved specialization and oversight capacity. The Department has been specifically working with Mental Health Services as of March 2014 to explore integrated levels of service provided to those who will require assistance upon release.

A request for proposal (RFP) is being developed to assess current programs and services in relation to risks and needs in Nunavut correctional facilities. The scope of work will include a review of psychological services. This RFP will be completed for submissions by early 2015.

143. Monitoring inmates’ progress. We found very limited monitoring of inmates’ progress at both the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility (Exhibit 5). In August 2013, the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility started to complete the required monthly progress reports; however, some correctional caseworkers still required training in case management, including how to complete progress reports. Department officials informed us that although progress reports were not prepared at the Baffin Correctional Centre, inmates’ progress was discussed at weekly management meetings. These meetings were not documented. Documentation of progress is important because it provides information on an inmate throughout the incarceration period and allows adjustments to be made as required. Our recommendation in this area of examination appears in paragraph 124.

144. Creating release plans. We found limited planning for the release of inmates at the Baffin Correctional Centre and the Rankin Inlet Healing Facility (Exhibit 5). This is important because planning for release is intended to help the inmate reintegrate into the community. We also found that the corrections directives contain little guidance on ways to plan for an inmate’s release, despite indicating the importance of such planning. Department officials informed us that community corrections officers are not currently involved in the case management of inmates, although Department officials are taking initial steps toward the continuation of care for inmates being released from facilities. Our recommendation in this area of examination appears in paragraph 124.

Conclusion

145. We concluded that the Department of Justice has not met its key responsibilities for inmates within the correctional system. We concluded that the Department of Justice did not adequately plan for and operate facilities to house inmates, and did not adequately manage inmates in compliance with key rehabilitation and reintegration requirements.