Canada’s Fighter Force—National Defence

Opening Statement to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts

Canada’s Fighter Force—National Defence

(Report 3—2018 Fall Reports of the Auditor General of Canada)

3 December 2018

Jerome Berthelette
Assistant Auditor General

Mr. Chair, thank you for this opportunity to present the results of our report on Canada’s fighter force. Joining me at the table is Ms. Casey Thomas, the Principal responsible for the audit.

Our audit focused on whether National Defence managed risks to Canada’s fighter force so that it could meet Canada’s commitments to North American Aerospace Defense CommandNORAD and North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNATO until a replacement fleet is operational.

In 2016, the Government of Canada directed National Defence to have enough fighter aircraft available every day to meet the highest NORAD alert level and Canada’s NATO commitment at the same time. This meant that National Defence had to increase by 23% the number of fighter aircraft available for operations. This new requirement came at a time when the Royal Canadian Air Force faced a growing shortage of trained and experienced pilots and technicians.

Even before the new operational requirement, the fighter force did not have enough experienced technicians and pilots. According to National Defence, as of April 2018, 22% of technician positions in CF-18 squadrons were vacant or were filled by technicians not yet fully qualified to do maintenance. Furthermore, National Defence identified that it had only 64% of the trained CF-18 pilots it needed to meet the government’s new requirement.

While there was a plan to increase the number of technicians, we found that there was no plan to increase the number of CF-18 pilots. Pilots have been leaving the fighter force faster than new ones could be trained. As a result, given the shortage of pilots and the limits of its training system, National Defence will not be able to meet the new operational requirement for many years.

Even though National Defence’s analysis showed that it needed additional technicians and pilots, the government focused on increasing the number of aircraft as the solution to meet the new requirement. It first planned to buy 18 new Super Hornets. However, because of a trade dispute, the government decided not to pursue this purchase.

The government is now planning to buy used fighter jets from Australia as an interim solution to bridge the gap to 2032, which is the current target date for completing the transition to a replacement fleet. However, even if National Defence can address its personnel shortage, the Australian jets are the same age and have the same operational limitations as Canada’s current fleet of CF-18s.

Furthermore, we found that the combat capability of the CF-18 has not been kept up to date. This is in part due to the advancing technology of modern fighter aircraft and a lack of investment to upgrade the CF-18’s combat systems. Without upgrades to its combat systems, the CF-18 will be increasingly less effective while deployed on NORAD and NATO operations. In our opinion, flying the CF-18 until 2032 without a plan to upgrade combat capability will result in less important roles for the fighter force. It will also pose a risk to Canada’s ability to contribute to NORAD and NATO operations.

National Defence expects to spend almost $3 billion to extend the life of its current fleet and to buy, operate, and maintain the interim aircraft. However, without a plan to deal with its biggest obstacles―a shortage of experienced pilots and the CF-18’s declining combat capability―these spending decisions will not be enough to meet Canada’s commitments. Until National Defence knows how and when it will solve pilot shortages and get better combat capability, more aircraft won’t solve its problems.

National Defence has agreed with our two recommendations and has developed an action plan.

Mr. Chair, this concludes my opening remarks. We would be pleased to answer any questions the Committee may have. Thank you.