Introduction

Background

5.1 The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) is Canada’s largest police force, with more than 18,000 officers in 2018. The RCMP provides Canadians with policing services at the federal, provincial and territorial, and municipal levels, and within Indigenous communities. It provides policing services under contract to about 150 municipalities and to all provinces and territories except Ontario and Quebec.

5.2 The RCMP operates through 15 divisions: 1 for each province and territory; 1 for its training facility in Regina, Saskatchewan; and 1 for its National Division in Ottawa, Ontario. The RCMP has about 700 local detachments, providing policing services to much of rural Canada, all of the North, and some urban communities, such as Moncton, New Brunswick, and Surrey, British Columbia. RCMP detachments vary greatly in size, from 2 officers in some rural and remote communities to more than 750 officers in cities.

5.3 Since 2001, there have been 9 shooting incidents that caused the deaths of 15 RCMP officers in total. On 4 June 2014, an assailant with powerful firearms killed 3 Moncton RCMP officers and wounded 2 others.

Focus of the audit

5.4 This audit focused on whether the RCMP provided its officers with hard body armour and semi-automatic weapons called carbines. A key use for this equipment is to protect officers in active shooter situations. The audit also looked at officer training on the use of carbines and pistols and at the maintenance of those firearms.

5.5 This audit is important because the RCMP is required to provide appropriate equipment and related training to comply with its duty to protect the health and safety of its officers under the Canada Labour Code and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act.

5.6 We did not examine other equipment that might be useful for responding to active shooter situations. We also did not examine the quality of RCMP training. Nor did we examine training for cadets, tactical skills training for active shooter situations, or specific training for specialized units, such as the Emergency Response Team.

5.7 More details about the audit objective, scope, approach, and criteria are in About the Audit at the end of this report.

Findings, Recommendations, and Responses

Overall message

5.8 Overall, we found that not all RCMP officers had access to the equipment they needed to respond to an active shooter situation. The RCMP had enough hard body armour nationwide, but its distribution across divisions left some officers without access to it. The RCMP did not set a national standard to manage the acquisition and distribution of carbines, including how many carbines were needed to equip officers. Nor did the RCMP have the necessary information at the national level to determine whether detachments across the country had enough protective equipment to meet the RCMP’s obligations under the Canada Labour Code.

5.9 The RCMP acquired and distributed almost three times the carbines and twice the hard body armour that it had in 2014, and it trained officers in their use. However, it did not prepare to meet all the long-term support requirements of adding a new weapon to its inventory, which affected compliance with its policies on both carbine maintenance and the annual recertification on carbine use. In part, these shortcomings stemmed from a lack of planning and oversight by RCMP National Headquarters.

Providing equipment to officers

5.10 After the Moncton shooting, the RCMP Commissioner requested an independent review of the shooting. Released in December 2014, the review stated that the officers had been outgunned by the assailant and did not have hard body armour to protect themselves against high-powered weapons. It made 64 recommendations, many of which addressed equipment and training gaps. The RCMP committed to implementing all of the recommendations, including expediting the rollout of a semi-automatic weapon called a carbine (Exhibit 5.1) and making sure that officers had access to hard body armour.

5.11 In 2017, the New Brunswick Provincial Court found the RCMP guilty of an offence under the Canada Labour Code for failing to provide the officers who responded to the Moncton incident with adequate equipment—specifically, carbines and hard body armour. The Court noted that the plan for the original rollout of carbines from 2012 to 2014 was under-resourced, badly managed, not properly prioritized, and lacked a sense of urgency. The Court also noted that “a real concern for the health and safety of front line members responding to active shooter events would have seen a rollout of the patrol carbine prioritized and not left to the vagrancies of available funding.”

The RCMP did not know whether it had enough carbines

5.12 We found that the RCMP did not set a national standard for carbine distribution that defined how many carbines were needed to adequately equip officers to respond to active shooters. Nor did the RCMP divisions consistently define who was most at risk. As a result, the RCMP did not know whether it had provided carbines to all of the officers who needed them. Also, the RCMP did not know how many more carbines it needed.

5.13 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topic:

• Number of carbines needed

5.14 This finding matters because the RCMP is responsible for protecting the health and safety of its officers. This depends on knowing which officers are most at risk and ensuring that they have access to carbines.

5.15 The RCMP provides policing services in many jurisdictions across Canada. However, because the RCMP is a federal organization, it has the duty to protect the health and safety of its officers under the Canada Labour Code regardless of where it operates.

5.16 In a May 2011 analysis, the RCMP found that its officers did not have the firearms they needed to respond effectively to assailants who were armed with high-powered weapons. In September 2011, the RCMP approved making carbines available to its officers.

5.17 Our recommendations in this area of examination appear at paragraphs 5.24 and 5.25.

5.18 What we examined. We examined whether the RCMP distributed enough carbines to its officers.

5.19 Number of carbines needed. We found that the RCMP did not know how many carbines it needed. In 2013, after its initial purchase of 527 carbines in the previous year, the RCMP estimated that it would need 2,500 more by 2018. Since then, however, the RCMP has acquired more than 4,500 more carbines, greatly exceeding its initial estimates.

5.20 Despite this large increase, the RCMP still did not know whether it had enough carbines. In 2014, it had committed to providing carbines to at-risk officers. However, we found that it did not consistently define who those officers were across divisions. It also did not set a national standard for the number of carbines needed to equip its officers. In our view, a national standard would take into account the risk of an active shooter situation in the officers’ locations.

5.21 In 2015, the RCMP began to provide carbines to detachments when officers completed their training on the weapons. Linking the distribution of carbines to officer training made the RCMP dependent on local decision making and available funding, leading to differences in the distribution of carbines across the RCMP.

5.22 We found that some detachments did not have enough carbines, which meant that they did not have any spares for when the carbines were being serviced.

5.23 We also found that at the detachment level, not all carbines were located as stated in the RCMP’s data. So, RCMP National Headquarters did not have a full picture of the actual location of the carbines within the divisions. The RCMP could not confirm that officers who needed the equipment had access to it.

5.24 Recommendation. The RCMP should establish a national standard to ensure that each detachment is adequately equipped with carbines.

The RCMP’s response. Agreed. The RCMP will develop a national standard that will complement existing RCMP operational standards related to active threats training: tactical (Immediate Action Rapid Deployment) and equipment (carbine).

Public and officer safety remains the RCMP’s top priority. The RCMP employs a variety of equipment and training that allow members to respond to incidents across the full spectrum of policing operations. The patrol carbine is a weapon system that can be employed by members during active threat situations, including, but not limited to, an active shooter. Use of this weapon system is complemented by tactical training courses such as Immediate Action Rapid Deployment, Initial Critical Incident Response, and Crisis Intervention and De-escalation. Carbine and Immediate Action Rapid Deployment training must now be completed by all cadets immediately after they graduate from Depot, the RCMP’s training facility in Regina, Saskatchewan.

In February 2018, commanding officers were provided with static maps from National Headquarters to monitor carbine distribution and training within their divisions. These maps have since evolved and, as of October 2018, are now available in an electronic, interactive format. Going forward, carbine distribution mapping will be complemented by ongoing risk assessments at the division or detachment level, giving commanding officers evidence-based information to continue to make sound, risk-based decisions on carbine distribution.

5.25 Recommendation. The RCMP should ensure that it has the necessary risk and distribution information at the national level to determine whether it has enough carbines to meet its obligations under the Canada Labour Code.

The RCMP’s response. Agreed. It is the RCMP’s duty to be as prepared as possible to mitigate threats.

Distribution information is already in place at the national level. The RCMP uses a national-level system to monitor the location of carbines and carbine-trained members across the country, by detachment. As of 11 January 2019, the RCMP had 4,931 patrol carbines, with 6,692 RCMP members trained (4,963 of these members are first responders). To support national and divisional situational awareness, in February 2018, commanding officers were provided with static maps from National Headquarters to monitor carbine distribution and training within their divisions. These maps have since evolved and, as of October 2018, are now available in an electronic, interactive format. Going forward, carbine distribution mapping will be complemented by ongoing risk assessments at the division or detachment level, giving commanding officers evidence-based information to continue to make sound, risk-based decisions on carbine distribution.

The RCMP largely met its requirement for providing hard body armour

5.26 We found that the RCMP had enough hard body armour nationwide to meet its policy requirement of providing one set for each operational vehicle plus 10%. However, as two divisions did not meet the requirement, not all officers had access to the armour.

5.27 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

• Distribution of hard body armour
• Data on hard body armour

5.28 This finding matters because the RCMP is responsible for protecting the health and safety of its officers. Hard body armour is essential protective equipment that can prevent serious injury or death when officers respond to active shooter incidents.

5.29 Hard body armour protects an officer’s vital organs from bullets from high-powered weapons (Exhibit 5.2). It is worn on top of an officer’s regular uniform, including the soft body armour. Because it weighs almost 7 kilograms and can restrict movement, officers do not wear hard body armour in most situations, for which the regulation soft armour is considered sufficient.

5.30 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 5.36.

5.31 What we examined. We examined whether the RCMP provided officers with hard body armour in compliance with the RCMP’s policy requirement.

5.32 Distribution of hard body armour. We found that although the RCMP had enough hard body armour nationwide to meet the RCMP’s policy requirement, not all divisions met the requirement.

5.33 In 2012, the RCMP defined its policy requirement for hard body armour as one per operational vehicle plus 10%, across all divisions. The divisions were responsible for determining their needs and distributing the armour. The RCMP did not define “operational vehicle”; so, to assess whether the RCMP had met this goal, we considered all marked and unmarked police vehicles to be operational. On that basis, we found that the RCMP had enough hard body armour nationwide.

5.34 However, we found that the Ontario and Quebec divisions did not meet the requirement. The two divisions were composed mainly of federal policing^{Definition i} officers. Despite having nearly identical policing responsibilities, these divisions interpreted the policy differently. One division almost met the requirement, while the other had less than one quarter of the required number. The RCMP policy requirement allows divisions to request exemptions, but neither division did so.

5.35 Data on hard body armour. The RCMP did not track its distribution of hard body armour in any national database. The only record of the armour’s distribution was at the division level. As a result, RCMP National Headquarters did not have a full picture of the actual location of the hard body armour within the divisions. RCMP National Headquarters needed this information to determine whether the RCMP had met its policy requirement at the detachment level of ensuring that its officers had access to this protective equipment.

5.36 Recommendation. The RCMP should ensure that it has the necessary information at the national level to determine whether detachments across the country have enough hard body armour to meet the RCMP’s obligations under the Canada Labour Code.

The RCMP’s response. Agreed. The health and safety of employees continues to be a top priority for the RCMP. The RCMP was found to have enough hard body armour nationwide to meet its requirements. This includes within those divisions to which the RCMP provides front-line policing services—that is, where the RCMP would be the police of local jurisdiction responsible for responding to an active threat. However, if gaps are identified, the RCMP will take measures on the basis of risk and unit circumstances.

Currently at the national level, the RCMP has the information necessary to monitor the overall number of hard body armour sets within each division. The RCMP’s national policy on hard body armour is even more granular than by detachment. Supervisors and commanders are required to maintain one set of hard body armour per operational vehicle plus 10%. This means that one set of hard body armour will be in every operational vehicle, or two sets if the vehicle is normally occupied by two members.

Providing training on firearms

The RCMP did not meet its recertification requirements for carbines and pistols

5.37 We found that the RCMP had met its target for the initial training of front-line officers on carbines, but 13% of these officers had not completed the annual recertification of their training. We also found that 13% of all officers who were required to carry pistols had not completed their annual pistol recertification.

5.38 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

• Carbine training and recertification
• Pistol recertification

5.39 This finding matters because using a firearm is an acquired skill: Regular training is needed to maintain and improve performance—especially because officers may need to use firearms under high levels of stress. Also, officers who have not recertified on the carbine can no longer carry one when responding to calls, placing these officers at higher risk of injury.

5.40 At the time of the Moncton shooting in 2014, the RCMP had about 1,500 carbines nationwide, but officers in the Moncton detachment had not yet been trained to use them.

5.41 RCMP policy requires officers who have been trained on carbines to recertify annually. The initial carbine training is a five-day course, and the annual recertification is a half-day course.

5.42 Almost all RCMP officers carry a pistol while on duty. The pistol is considered an essential weapon for both ordinary policing operations and active shooter situations. Every officer who is required to carry a pistol on duty must complete the pistol recertification every year.

5.43 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 5.49.

5.44 What we examined. We examined whether the RCMP met its commitment to train 65% of front-line officers on carbines and whether trained officers completed the annual recertification. We also examined whether all officers who were required to carry a pistol recertified every year.

5.45 Carbine training and recertification. The RCMP determined that its front-line officers were most exposed to the risks associated with responding to shooting events. It committed to increasing the percentage of carbine-trained officers each year and set a goal of 65% of front-line officers in each division by 31 March 2018. We found that the RCMP had met this goal, with 74% (6,092 of 8,185) having taken the carbine course. By then, all cadets were being trained on carbines; so, the number and proportion of initially trained officers should continue to increase.

5.46 However, we found that about 13% of front-line officers who had received the initial training, and were due to recertify, had not completed the annual recertification as of 31 October 2018.

5.47 When initially distributing the carbines, the RCMP did not plan for the continually growing need for carbine recertification. To recertify front-line officers who had received the initial training by October 2018, the RCMP would need to increase its training capacity by 18%. Further increases will likely be needed as more cadets are trained.

5.48 Pistol recertification. We found that 13% of all RCMP officers had not completed the mandatory pistol recertification. Although this is an improvement over the rate of 23% reported in our 2005 November Report of the Auditor General of Canada, Chapter 1—Royal Canadian Mounted Police—Contract Policing, it still means that the RCMP did not meet its annual recertification requirements.

5.49 Recommendation. The RCMP should ensure that officers recertify on the use of their firearms in compliance with policy requirements.

The RCMP’s response. Agreed. The RCMP recognizes the importance of ensuring a ready workforce and is taking actions to review its existing firearms training policies and its enabling compliance and reporting mechanisms to achieve the highest level of accountability. This work will be carried out under the guidance of the RCMP’s National Mandatory Training Oversight Committee.

Following the recommendations of the MacNeil Report (Independent Review—Moncton Shooting—June 4, 2014), the RCMP has made and continues to make significant efforts to adapt firearms training practices to the evolving nature of police encounters. We are also advancing efforts to understand the key factors that affect compliance rates for firearms training. Future training practices and policies will be shaped by the feedback we receive, to ensure continued police and public safety.

These collective actions uphold our commitment to meet our obligations under the Canada Labour Code, Part II.

Maintaining firearms

The RCMP did not perform preventive maintenance of pistols and carbines as required

5.50 We found that half of the RCMP carbines had not been maintained according to RCMP policy. Likewise, the RCMP did not meet its policy requirements for the maintenance of pistols.

5.51 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topics:

• Maintenance of carbines
• Maintenance of pistols

5.52 This finding matters because a firearm must be well maintained to ensure that it functions when an officer needs it to respond to a lethal threat—which is generally without warning. Also, failure to maintain a firearm can accelerate the need for major repairs or shorten its operational life.

5.53 RCMP policy states that pistols and carbines must be sent to the armoury for preventive maintenance every three years or after every 5,000 rounds fired, whichever comes first. Trained armourers conduct preventive maintenance at the RCMP’s two armouries in Regina and Ottawa. This maintenance involves cleaning, adjusting, and replacing parts that are subject to wear.

5.54 The RCMP must provide a temporary replacement pistol to every officer who submits a pistol for maintenance. Individual officers are responsible for ensuring that their pistols are maintained according to policy. Detachment commanders, not the individual officers, are responsible for ensuring that carbines are maintained.

5.55 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 5.61.

5.56 What we examined. We examined whether the RCMP completed preventive maintenance on carbines and pistols as required by its policy. Because the RCMP did not track how many rounds its firearms had used, we could examine when they were due for maintenance only on the basis of their ages.

5.57 Maintenance of carbines. We found that the RCMP did not meet its policy requirement for maintaining carbines. By 31 October 2018, the RCMP had 6,211 carbines in service. Almost 3,300 had been acquired before November 2015 and would therefore have required maintenance at least once in the past three years. We found that 50% (1,644) of those carbines had not been maintained in the past three years.

5.58 For the RCMP to achieve 100% compliance for its current carbines, it would need to perform preventive maintenance on 2,070 carbines per year for the next three years. This would mean a 30% increase in workload over the previous three-year average. We noted that the RCMP did not plan for the ongoing preventive maintenance of the carbines when it began distributing them.

5.59 Maintenance of pistols. We found that the RCMP did not meet its policy requirement for maintaining pistols. As of 31 October 2018, the RCMP had 26,300 pistols in its inventory, of which 18,408 (70%) were issued to officers. We found that 1,689 (9%) of the pistols issued to officers had not been maintained as required.

5.60 Officers use spare pistols when they send their regularly issued pistols for maintenance. More than 7,800 spare pistols (30% of all pistols in inventory) were stored and managed by detachments, divisions, and the armouries. These pistols must also be maintained, because they could be put into service at any time. We found that 4,277 (54%) of the spare pistols had not been maintained as required.

5.61 Recommendation. The RCMP should ensure that it completes its preventive maintenance on pistols and carbines in compliance with its policy requirements.

The RCMP’s response. Agreed. The RCMP thanks the Office of the Auditor General of Canada for highlighting the need for the RCMP’s policy on firearms maintenance to accurately reflect the intent of the policy as demonstrated by current firearms maintenance practices. The overall objective of the RCMP is to ensure that members have safe and reliable firearms for use in their duties, and spares when required. The RCMP believes that it is meeting this objective. The RCMP will clarify its existing policy to ensure that the expected period for servicing is clearly articulated and will continue to enforce its firearms maintenance practices so that members have safe and reliable firearms for use in their duties.

Managing the carbine project

The RCMP did not properly manage the acquisition of carbines

5.62 We found that the RCMP did not have a plan to manage the acquisition of carbines, causing bottlenecks in distribution and backlogs in firearm recertification and maintenance. We also found that in the RCMP’s effort to expedite the rollout of the carbines, the RCMP and Public Services and Procurement Canada did not follow procurement rules.

5.63 Our analysis supporting this finding presents what we examined and discusses the following topic:

• Inadequate planning

5.64 This finding matters because the failure by the RCMP to properly manage its assets could increase costs and compromise outcomes.

5.65 The Treasury Board’s Policy Framework for the Management of Assets and Acquired Services requires the RCMP to demonstrate value for money and sound stewardship in its management of assets. The RCMP achieves this by making strategic decisions on the best use of its assets, by considering their support requirements from planning to disposal (known as life-cycle management), and by conducting the risk-based oversight and monitoring of them.

5.66 Public Services and Procurement Canada is the central purchasing agent of equipment for the government, including the RCMP. For large, complex acquisition projects that exceed the RCMP’s authorities, Public Services and Procurement Canada and the RCMP work together to develop procurement strategies that satisfy operational requirements. Public Services and Procurement Canada also provides services that enhance the efficiency and integrity of the contracting process. It can suspend procurements if the integrity of the process is brought into question.

5.67 Since 2013, the RCMP has acquired carbines by using standing offers established through the Munitions Supply Program, which is managed by Public Services and Procurement Canada. Standing offers allow the RCMP to purchase carbines when required, through a call-up process. A separate contract is formed each time a call-up is made against the standing offer.

5.68 Our recommendation in this area of examination appears at paragraph 5.75.

5.69 What we examined. We examined whether the RCMP defined the distribution and long-term support requirements for the carbine project. We also examined whether the RCMP and Public Services and Procurement Canada followed contracting rules during the acquisition process.

5.70 Inadequate planning. We found that the RCMP did not have a plan for acquiring carbines after buying the first 527 carbines in 2012. It did not establish a national standard for the location and number of carbines required to ensure that its officers were adequately equipped (see paragraphs 5.19 to 5.23). Rather, it expected divisions and detachments to make these decisions.

5.71 The decentralized approach contributed to the RCMP and Public Services and Procurement Canada not following procurement rules. In June 2015, the RCMP received orders from its divisions for an unusually large number of carbines. Under procurement rules, the RCMP should have submitted these orders to Public Services and Procurement Canada as a single request. However, this request would have exceeded Public Services and Procurement Canada’s own purchase authority and therefore would have required approval from the Treasury Board. Instead, the RCMP split the order into three requests, which Public Services and Procurement Canada ordered under its own authority.

5.72 In our view, this situation was a missed opportunity for the RCMP. The Treasury Board’s challenge function would have prompted the RCMP to define the objectives of the carbine acquisition and how it intended to meet them, contributing to better planning. As acquisitions increase in value, additional scrutiny is added to the acquisition process to ensure that taxpayers’ money is spent effectively.

5.73 The RCMP also did not consider all of the life-cycle stages of the carbine project, such as planning to meet the ongoing recertification needs for officers to safely operate the carbines (see paragraphs 5.45 to 5.47). Nor did the RCMP plan for the need to maintain the carbines over the long term, and it had fallen behind in maintaining them (see paragraphs 5.57 and 5.58).

5.74 We also found that the RCMP did not provide its armouries with more resources to manage the addition of more than 5,500 carbines. In addition to conducting preventive maintenance on the carbines, the armoury was also responsible for assembling each one. We found that it took about four months for the manufacturer to deliver the carbines, and the armoury then took about five months to assemble and ship them out. As a result, divisions that identified a need for carbines faced about a nine-month period between ordering them and receiving them in the field. In our view, had the RCMP properly planned this project, it would have been able to anticipate the increase in the armoury’s workload, as well as in recertification demands, and could have planned the appropriate increase in capacity as part of the acquisition.

5.75 Recommendation. The RCMP should properly manage acquisition projects, including ensuring that life-cycle requirements, such as training and maintenance, are addressed.

The RCMP’s response. Agreed. The RCMP will examine options for more robust project management and will ensure that life-cycle elements are considered during the project approval process.

The RCMP has improved its oversight on officer safety equipment. For example, in November 2015, the RCMP created an Operational Equipment Oversight Committee, which is composed of key senior managers. Priority officer safety equipment has been identified, and these items are being monitored by the Committee to ensure timely advancement of the procurement, training, and health and safety components.

Conclusion

5.76 We concluded that the RCMP had not provided all of its officers with access to hard body armour, carbines, and recertification training to respond to an active shooter. The RCMP also did not keep pace with its recertification requirements for pistols, nor ensure that pistols and carbines were properly maintained.