Study on the new relationship between Canada and First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples

Opening Statement to the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples

Study on the new relationship between Canada and First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples

6 February 2018

Michael Ferguson, Chartered Professional AccountantCPA, Chartered AccountantCA
Fellow Chartered Professional AccountantFCPA, Fellow Chartered AccountantFCA (New Brunswick)
Auditor General of Canada

Madam Chair, we are pleased to be here to talk about our audit work that may be useful to your Committee’s study on the new relationship between Canada and First Nations, Inuit and Métis peoples. Joining me today are Joe Martire, Jim McKenzie and Glenn Wheeler.

The Office of the Auditor General has a long history of auditing federal programs and activities that affect Indigenous peoples. In 2011, we brought some of that work together in a status report that looked at what the federal government had done to implement the recommendations we made in seven audits we issued between 2002 and 2008. We showed that the government had not made any improvement in the results of the programs we looked at.

We also included a preface to our 2011 status report, in which we identified four impediments that severely limited the delivery of public services to First Nations communities and hindered improvements in living conditions on reserves.

Since 2011, we have done more audits on topics that are of particular interest to Indigenous peoples. We are including a brief summary of some of these audits to this statement. Based on our recent work, I am sorry to report that there still has been little improvement in federal government programs for Indigenous peoples.

Madam Chair, I want to be clear that we find it very disappointing. In a message I issued in 2016, I said that my predecessor, near the end of her mandate, summed up her impression of 10 years of audits on First Nations issues with the word “unacceptable.” Since my arrival, we have continued to audit these issues. When you add the results of our recent audits to those we reported on in the past, I can only describe the situation as it exists now as beyond unacceptable.

We have consistently shown that government programs have failed to effectively serve Canada’s Indigenous peoples. Delivering effective programming requires leadership—leadership from federal, provincial, territorial, and First Nations levels—with most of the responsibility falling on the federal government, though all levels have some responsibility. Until a problem-solving mindset is brought to these issues to develop solutions built around people instead of defaulting to litigation, arguments about money, and process roadblocks, this country will continue to squander the potential and lives of much of its Indigenous population.

In an effort to find solutions, we identified eight factors that need to be in place to make programs for Indigenous peoples work. We compiled these eight factors to identify how to improve services. But, many of them are also important to establishing a mature relationship between the federal government and Indigenous peoples.

The first factor is sustained political will. In our 2015 report, Establishing the First Nations Health Authority in British Columbia, we said that the sustained commitment over a period of 10 years by leaders from British Columbia First Nations, the Government of Canada, and the Government of British Columbia built a climate of trust and respect that allowed the parties to establish the First Nations Health Authority in British Columbia.

The second factor is aggregation. One challenge to creating a new relationship is the level of disaggregation that has existed. On the one hand, there are over 600 Indigenous communities and representative organizations, and on the other hand, there have been multiple federal departments under no common direction. Also, the provinces and territories are involved.

In the negotiations to establish the First Nations Health Authority in British Columbia, First Nations across British Columbia agreed to a unified approach to negotiation with other levels of government, so they formed the First Nations Leadership Council. This Council acted as a single point of contact for the federal and provincial governments.

The third factor is real consultation. There are many people who know much more than I do about the duty to consult. Consultation is something that we have mentioned in a number of our audits. For example, in our 2016 audit of the First Nations specific claims process, we said that, without input from First Nations, Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada developed a separate process to settle small-value claims.

But, because it did not seek input from First Nations, the Department created barriers to, rather than removed barriers from, the settlement process. For example,

The fourth factor is the need for clear statements on the level of service to be delivered. This factor, along with the three factors that follow, were the four impediments we identified in 2011.

In 2015, we reported on this problem in our audit on access to health services for remote First Nations communities. We found that Health Canada did not compare the access that remote First Nations communities had to health services with the access other remote communities had to health services. The Department had not met its objective of ensuring that remote First Nations communities had comparable access to the clinical and client care services as other provincial residents living in similar geographic locations.

The fifth factor is the need for an appropriate legislative base that supports the desired level of services. A legislative base is an unambiguous commitment by the government to deliver certain services. It allows funding to be defined, and it leads to accountability.

The federal government has often developed programs to support First Nations communities without establishing a legislative base. In 2011, we said that this meant there was no legislation for programs in areas such as education, health, and drinking water for First Nations members living on reserves.

In our 2014 report on the First Nations Policing Program, we found that in Alberta and Manitoba, the policing agreements clearly required services funded by the Program to comply with provincial policing legislation and standards.

But, we found that for the two agreements we examined in Ontario, there was no requirement for self-administered policing services in First Nations communities to comply with provincial policing legislation and standards.

The sixth factor is the capacity for local service delivery with appropriate governance structures and accountability to the Indigenous peoples receiving the services.

Provinces have established many organizations and structures to support local delivery of programs and services. For example, provinces have school boards and health services boards. In 2011, we said that there were few similar organizations to support service delivery within First Nations communities.

But even when local service delivery organizations are established, they will be successful only if they have appropriate governance structures in place.

In our 2015 report on establishing the First Nations Health Authority in British Columbia, we were able to show that, in establishing the Authority, the parties overcame the four impediments we identified in 2011. But, we found problems in the Authority’s governance framework.

The seventh factor is appropriate and stable funding.

In 2015, we looked at the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement. This agreement was signed in 2005 by the Labrador Inuit and the governments of Canada and Newfoundland and Labrador. It was a comprehensive land claims agreement that settled Indigenous title and ownership of lands and resources, and set out the future relationships and obligations of the three signatories.

The agreement was supported by a five-year Fiscal Financing Agreement that provided financial support to the Nunatsiavut Government. But, even though the Nunatsiavut Government had responsibilities under the agreement for housing, the lack of a federal program for Inuit housing south of the 60th parallel limited the Nunatsiavut Government’s ability to fulfill its housing responsibilities.

The eighth and final factor is the need for the federal government to monitor whether it is living up to its commitments.

In our 2014 audit of the Nutrition North Canada program, we found that the measurement strategy of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada’s established performance indicators, such as the weight of food shipped. However, there was no indicator to measure whether the full subsidy on food was passed on to consumers.

So, the Department measured what was easy to measure—how much food was shipped—and did not measure what was important—did the food get to the intended beneficiaries, and what was the effect of the program on the price of the subsidized food?

In our opinion, it is critical for the government to measure its performance and faithfully report its results as measured against the program terms and conditions in order to know whether its programs are improving people's lives.

Madam Chair, we hope that we can contribute to your Committee’s reflections. We would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Parliament of Canada

2017 Fall Reports

Report 4—Oral Health Programs for First Nations and Inuit—Health Canada

We concluded that while Health Canada provided Inuit and First Nations people with access to important oral health services, the Department did not demonstrate how much its oral health programs helped maintain and improve the overall oral health of Inuit and First Nations at the population level.

2017 Spring Reports

Report 6—Civil Aviation Infrastructure in the North—Transport Canada

We concluded that Transport Canada had the information it needed to assess the infrastructure challenges remote northern airports face. However, the Department did not take the lead by working with others to address these infrastructure challenges. The Department’s role in addressing infrastructure needs centred on the Airports Capital Assistance Program, which provided funding for safety-related projects at remote northern airports. However, the funding available through the program will not be sufficient to meet remote northern airports’ needs.

2016 Fall Reports

Report 6—First Nations Specific Claims—Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada

We concluded that Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada did not adequately manage the resolution of First Nations specific claims as defined for the purpose of this audit. Funding cuts and lack of information sharing between the Department and First Nations posed barriers to First Nations’ access to the process for resolving specific claims.

Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada met its commitment to assess specific claims in three years. Certain systems and practices that the Department put in place to accelerate the negotiation of claims hindered the resolution of some First Nations claims. The Department failed to increase the use of mediation services and did not use available information and feedback to improve program performance.

Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada’s selective reporting on the specific claims process provided an incomplete picture of results, which made it difficult for parliamentarians and Canadians to accurately assess overall program success.

Report 3—Preparing Indigenous Offenders for Release—Correctional Service Canada

We concluded that Correctional Service Canada provided correctional programs to Indigenous offenders to assist with their rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community, but did not do so in a timely manner. Correctional Service Canada staff did not adequately define or document how offenders’ participation in culturally specific correctional interventions contributed to their potential for successful reintegration into the community. As well, staff was not provided with sufficient guidance or training on how to apply Aboriginal social history factors in case management decisions.

2015 Fall Reports

Report 3—Implementing the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement

We concluded that federal government entities made progress implementing selected obligations in the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement and two related side agreements. However, there were challenges that needed to be resolved. We found ongoing differences in interpretations between Fisheries and Oceans Canada and the Nunatsiavut Government over fisheries-related obligations. We also found that Parks Canada had acted upon commitments set out in the Labrador Inuit Park Impacts and Benefits Agreement, resulting in economic benefits including employment for the Labrador Inuit. Finally, we found that the Fiscal Financing Agreement signed by Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada provided financial support to the Nunatsiavut Government, which had been important for its self-government. However, the lack of a federal program for Inuit housing had affected the Nunatsiavut Government’s ability to fulfill housing responsibilities it received by signing this side agreement.

Report 7—Establishing the First Nations Health Authority in British Columbia

Efforts by Health Canada to work with First Nations in British Columbia to establish the First Nations Health Authority represented a different approach to resolving a long-standing health issue: the poorer health outcomes of First Nations people in British Columbia than those of other residents. Through sustained collaboration, First Nations and federal and provincial partners overcame the long-standing structural impediments to providing services to First Nations, which we identified in our 2011 report. However, we also found weaknesses in the Authority’s accountability and governance framework. Although the Authority had policies in place to guide its operations, there were some weaknesses in the Authority’s policies that we examined, and a lack of guidance surrounding how they were to be implemented. In addition, the Authority did not fully comply with requirements set out in some of its policies.

2015 Spring Reports

Report 4—Access to Health Services for Remote First Nations Communities

Overall, we concluded that Health Canada did not have reasonable assurance that eligible First Nations individuals living in remote communities in Manitoba and Ontario had access to clinical and client care services and medical transportation benefits as defined for the purpose of this performance audit.

2014 Fall Report

Chapter 6—Nutrition North Canada—Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada

Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada’s Nutrition North Canada program replaced the Food Mail Program in April 2011. Departmental data showed that the weight of items subsidized under the Nutrition North Canada program in the 2012–13 fiscal year had increased by about 25% compared with the weight subsidized in the final year of the Food Mail Program. However, we found that the Department had not identified communities eligible for the subsidy on the basis of need, that it had not verified whether northern retailers passed on the full subsidy to consumers, and that it had not collected the information needed to manage the program or measure its success. We found that Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada had not managed the Program to meet its objective of making healthy foods more accessible to residents of isolated northern communities, as it had not identified eligible communities on the basis of need.

2014 Spring Report

Chapter 5—First Nations Policing Program—Public Safety Canada

Overall, we concluded that Public Safety Canada’s First Nations Policing Program was not adequately designed to deliver and did not adequately ensure that policing services on First Nations reserves were delivered in a manner that was consistent with the principles of the First Nations Policing Policy that we examined.

Chapter 6—Transfer Payment Programs—Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency

The Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency had not managed and delivered selected economic development transfer payment programs in accordance with key requirements of the Policy on Transfer Payments. The Agency’s administration of contribution agreements was weak, monitoring of recipients was inadequate, and the Agency had not measured and reported on whether its programs were achieving their objectives. However, the Agency had begun to address these issues. In 2012, it established a management control framework that set out expectations on how its transfer payment programs were to be managed, and it was implementing this framework. As well, it had started to harmonize its economic development programs.

When the Agency was created, the government determined that the headquarters would be located in the North, as part of the federal government’s Northern Strategy. However, the Agency was not able to fill some positions at its Iqaluit headquarters, and key corporate functions and senior management positions were in its Ottawa liaison office.

2013 Fall Report

Chapter 6—Emergency Management on Reserves

Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada had taken some steps and had plans to address some of the issues identified in the audit. However, we concluded that during the period covered by the audit (September 2012 to August 2013), the Department had not taken sufficient steps to adequately manage those areas of emergency management support to First Nations on reserves that we examined. Except for not having clearly defined its roles and responsibilities and not being able to fully substantiate whether First Nations communities have appropriate pandemic plans, Health Canada had taken sufficient steps to adequately manage its emergency management support to First Nations on reserves.

2013 Spring Report

Chapter 6—Creating a Historical Record of Indian Residential Schools

Overall, we found that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada had not taken adequate steps in relation to the creation of as complete a historical record as possible of the Indian residential school system and legacy. The Commission and, on behalf of the Government of Canada, Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada could not find common ground upon which to cooperate and agree on answers to essential questions, including what constituted relevant documents, where to search, what time frame the documents would cover, what formats to use for long-term preservation and accessibility, when the documents would be provided, and who would cover what costs.

2011 Status Report

Chapter 4—Programs for First Nations on Reserves

While considerable efforts have been made, conditions have generally not improved for First Nations in each of the areas subject to our audit. We found that the education gap between First Nations living on reserves and the general Canadian population has widened, housing is in poor condition and the housing shortage has increased, and more than half of drinking water systems on reserves still pose a significant risk to communities. Improving conditions on reserves will be a difficult challenge. It will take First Nations and government working together in new ways to resolve these issues.

Reports of the Auditor General of Canada to the Northern Legislative Assemblies

Nunavut

2017—Health Care Services—Nunavut

We concluded that the Department of Health did not adequately manage and support its health care personnel to deliver services in local and regional health centres in Nunavut. It also did not adequately consider the changing needs of communities when planning the staffing of health centres. In addition, the recruitment of nurses and other health care personnel, which involves both the Department of Health and the Department of Finance, was not effective for staffing vacant positions or meeting the staffing needs of the Department of Health.

2015—Corrections in Nunavut—Department of Justice

We concluded that the Department of Justice has not met its key responsibilities for inmates within the correctional system. We concluded that the Department of Justice did not adequately plan for and operate facilities to house inmates, and did not adequately manage inmates in compliance with key rehabilitation and reintegration requirements.

Northwest Territories

2017—Climate Change in the Northwest Territories

We concluded that the measures taken by selected Government of the Northwest Territories departments were not adequate to fulfill the government’s climate change commitments to reduce territorial greenhouse gas emissions and to adapt to climate change impacts in the Northwest Territories.

2016—Support to Communities for Municipal Services in the Northwest Territories—Department of Municipal and Community Affairs

We concluded that the Department of Municipal and Community Affairs did not adequately support community governments’ delivery of the essential services it funded. Although the Department monitored community governments’ provision of some essential services to residents, it did not adequately assist community governments to help ensure essential services were provided in accordance with requirements. We found that risks remained in delivering these services and that the Department’s actions to mitigate these risks in many cases were not sufficient.

Community governments are responsible for the delivery of essential services to their residents. However, the Department must adequately monitor and support these community governments, and assist them in managing risks associated with inadequate service delivery.

2015—Corrections in the Northwest Territories—Department of Justice

We concluded that the Department of Justice has not met its key responsibilities for inmates within the correctional system. We concluded that the Department of Justice adequately planned for its facilities. However, we concluded that the Department did not adequately operate facilities to house inmates and did not adequately manage inmates in compliance with key rehabilitation and reintegration requirements.

Yukon

2017—Climate Change in Yukon

We concluded that the Department of Environment; the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources; and the Department of Community Services had not worked sufficiently to adapt to the impacts of climate change. We also concluded that the Department of Environment; the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources; the Department of Highways and Public Works; and the Department of Community Services had not worked sufficiently to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, the Government of Yukon had created a climate change strategy, an action plan, and two progress reports that took present and future generations into account.

2017—Capital Asset Management—Yukon

We concluded that the Department of Highways and Public Works did not meet its key responsibilities for capital asset management. While it managed transportation infrastructure adequately, it did not adequately manage building infrastructure.

We concluded that the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Social Services met their key responsibilities for capital asset management. However, in our opinion, by not monitoring to see that radon testing and remediation had been done, the Department of Health and Social Services did not do enough to take into account the health and safety of building users.

2017—Government Transfers to Societies—Yukon

We concluded that the Department of Community Services and the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources did not adequately manage selected government transfers to societies in accordance with key legislative, policy, and administrative requirements. We also concluded that the Department of Economic Development adequately managed selected government transfers to societies in accordance with key legislative, policy, and administrative requirements.

We concluded that the Department of Finance conducted sufficient monitoring to identify and report on matters of non-compliance on selected departments, and that the Registrar, operating from within the Department of Community Services, provided sufficient monitoring and administrative support to these departments.

2015—Corrections in Yukon—Department of Justice

We concluded that the Department adequately planned for and operated the Whitehorse Correctional Centre. However, it did not adequately manage offenders in compliance with key requirements. Therefore, we concluded that the Department of Justice has not met its key responsibilities for offenders within the corrections system.